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InTroduCTIon
Arbitral autonomy largely depends on the degree in which the courts 
involve themselves in the arbitration process. Yet, arbitration should 
not be entirely impervious to court assistance for its very efficacy may 
sometimes depend on the involvement of the courts. Be it through an 
order to compel arbitration, the designation of arbitrators, or even the 
issuance of conservatory measures, courts often help effectuate arbitral 
justice.
For a long time now, authors have discussed and debated India’s 
status as a pro or anti arbitration forum. Naturally, a large portion of the 
analysis has revolved around whether the involvement of India’s courts 
constitutes intrusion or assistance. In other words, whether Indian 
1 Humphrey Fellow at the American University Washington College of Law; 
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courts respect the parties’ choice to resort to arbitration or whether 
Indian courts have been reluctant to relinquish certain control over the 
arbitral process.
This article discusses Indian Courts’ prerogatives regarding the 
supervision of international commercial arbitration and the enforcement 
of arbitral awards.2 In light of recent inconsistent judgments rendered by 
Indian courts, this article argues for greater precaution and care when 
drafting arbitration agreements or enforcing arbitral awards in India. 
Indeed, it is essential for practitioners involved to some degree with 
arbitration in India to be aware of some of the complexities that arise 
in relation to the enforcements stages of both the arbitration agreement 
and the arbitral award.
First, the article briefly provides background regarding Indian 
arbitration, and sets out the salient features of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter, “the 1996 Act”). Second, it 
argues that jurisprudential inconsistencies have created confusion as to 
the scope of judicial intervention in Indian arbitration law. Finally, it 
recommends that courts take steps to facilitate arbitration in India by 
refraining from unnecessary interference with the arbitral process.
I. Background
A. The Historical Development of Arbitration Laws in India
Rooted in ancient times, arbitration has had a long history in the 
Indian sub-continent. In the past, communities would often submit their 
2 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act governs both domestic and international 
commercial arbitration in India, and is divided into separate parts. See generally The 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, India Code (2000) [hereinafter the 
1996 Act], available at http://www.netlawman.co.in/acts/arbitration-conciliation-
act-1996.php#PART_I. Part I deals with arbitration in general, while Part II deals 
specifically with the enforcement of foreign awards. In Part II Chapter 1, “foreign 
award” is defined as, “an arbitral award on differences between persons arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial under the 
law in force in India, made on or after the 11th day of October, 1960—(a) in pursuance 
of an agreement in writing for arbitration to which the Convention set forth in the First 
Schedule [i.e. the New York Convention] applies, and (b) in one of such territories as 
the Central Government, being satisfied that reciprocal provisions have been made 
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be territories to which the said 
[New York]Convention applies.” Id. 
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disputes to wise men referred to as panchayat.3 The informal panchayat 
arbitration system has been used to resolve many disputes and contin-
ues to play an important role in the more remote villages of India.4 With 
respect to commercial disputes, references to arbitration can be traced 
back to the Bengal Regulations, enacted in 1772 during British rule.5 
These Regulations provided that a dispute could be submitted to a court 
of arbitration so long as the parties consented to the arbitration, and the 
dispute arose out of lawsuits for accounts, partnership deeds, or breach 
of contract.6
Later, three more modern instruments were implemented to regulate 
commercial arbitration in the Indian subcontinent: (i) the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act 1937,7 (ii) the 1940 Indian Arbitration 
Act,8 and (iii) the 1961 Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) 
Act.9 The Arbitration Act of 1937 dealt solely with the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards, and was later replaced by the 1961 Foreign 
Awards Act, which implemented the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards.10 The 1940 Indian 
Arbitration Act dealt with domestic arbitration and greatly resembled the 
1934 English Arbitration Act. In an effort to modernize the regulatory 
3 Krishma Sarma, Momota Oinam & Angshuman Kaushik, Development and 
Practice of Arbitration in India—Has it Evolved as an Effective Legal Institution 
(Freeman Spogli Inst. For Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 103, 2009), http://iis-db.
stanford.edu/pubs/22693/No_103_Sarma_India_Arbitration_India_509.pdf; see infra 
note 5 and accompanying text (discussing history of commercial arbitral disputes).
4 Justice Dr. M.K. Sharma, Conciliation and Mediation, Delhi Mediation Centre, 
http://delhimediationcentre.gov.in/articles.htm#introducing (last visited May 29, 
2012).
5 Mrinalini Singh, Renovating the Bridge, Legal Service India (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://legalservicesindia.com/article/article/renovating-the-bridge-1062-1.html.
6 Id.
7 The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937, India Code (2000) 
available at http://www.helplinelaw.com/docs/THE%20ARBITRATION%20
%28PROTOCOL%20AND%20CONVENTION%29%20ACT,%201937.
8 The Arbitration Act, No. 10 of 1940, India Code (2000), available at http://www.
indiankanoon.org/doc/1052228/.
The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961, India Code (2000), 
available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1695780/.
9 The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961, India Code 
(2000), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1695780/.
10 See preamble to The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961.
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framework that governed arbitration in India, the Legislature passed the 
1996 Act, thereby repealing the three instruments mentioned-above.11
B. Salient Features of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act of 1996
The primary purpose of the 1996 Act was to encourage arbitration 
as a cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism, reflected in the pre-
amble to Act.12 Thus, the 1996 Act was constructed to provide a modern 
arbitration instrument respecting both the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Modern Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the 
“Model Law”).13 Indeed, it not only acknowledges the importance of the 
Model Law but also recognizes the need for uniformity in arbitration 
legislation throughout the world.14
The 1996 Act is divided into two parts. Part I addresses domestic 
and international commercial arbitration, and applies “where the place 
of arbitration is in India.” Part II of the 1996 Act applies to arbitration 
proceedings outside of India, thus providing the applicable rules when 
parties are seeking enforcement of the foreign arbitral award within 
India. Consequently, the 1996 Act establishes an important distinction 
between what is considered domestic arbitration, and what is considered 
foreign arbitration.15 The 1996 Act goes beyond distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign awards by specifying and defining international 
11 See the 1996 Act (“. . . An Act to ‘consolidate and amend the law relating to 
domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards as also to define the law relating to conciliation and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.”).
12 See id. (stating, “ . . . [whereas] the said Model Law and Rules make significant 
contribution to the establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient 
settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations; [and whereas] it is 
expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account the 
aforesaid Model Law and Rules . . . .”).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Compare id. § 2(7) (“An arbitral award made under this, Part shall be considered as 
a domestic award.”), with id. at Part II (dealing with the enforcement of foreign awards).
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commercial arbitration.16 However, falling within this definition, alone, 
does not take an arbitral dispute and subsequent award from the realm 
of domestic to foreign.17 Instead, any arbitral proceeding, including 
those defined as international commercial disputes, remain domestic—
for purposes of the 1996 Act—so long as the place of arbitration is in 
India.18 Accordingly, the 1996 Act is indifferent to the international 
nature of the dispute covered by arbitration—the distinction stems 
solely from the situs of the arbitral proceeding.19
C. Judicial Intervention under the Indian 1996 Act
The 1996 Act has contributed to the modernization of the regulatory 
framework for arbitration in India.20 With respect to court intervention, 
the 1996 Act provides similar provisions to Article 5 of the Model Law,21 
which limits the courts’ involvement in international arbitration to mat-
ters for which the Model Law has made express provision. In fact, the 
1996 Act states, “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in any other law 
for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial 
authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”22 The 
1996 Act was thus enacted to make arbitration more efficient and curtail 
16 See id. § 2(f) (“. . . ‘international commercial arbitration’ means an arbitration 
relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, 
considered as commercial under the law in force in India and where at least one of 
the parties is—(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any 
country other than India; or (ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country 
other than India; or (iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals whose 
central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or (iv) 
the Government of a foreign country. . . .”).
17 See id. § 2(7) (“An arbitral award made under this, Part shall be considered as a 
domestic award.”).
18 See id. § 2(2) (“Scope. This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in 
India.”).
19 See id. § 44 (defining “foreign awards” as disputes arising in territories where 
the New York Convention applies) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 15-18 
(distinguishing between domestic and foreign awards).
20 See Singh, supra note 5 (stating that the 1996 Act has unified the legal regime 
surrounding arbitration, as well as improving arbitral efficiency).
21 See generally UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, adopted Dec. 11 1985, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_
arbitration.html.
22 The 1996 Act, § 5.
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the court interferences that the 1940 Act allowed.23 However, the Act 
does not completely forbid court interference in all circumstances; it in 
fact allows judicial intervention in quite a few situations.24 Specifically, 
courts may: refer a dispute to arbitration where there is an arbitration 
agreement;25 issue interim orders;26 appoint or fire arbitrators;27 pro-
vide assistance in evidence-gathering;28 set aside an award;29 enforce 
an award by decree;30 grant appeals against certain orders;31 direct the 
delivery of an award;32 and, refer a dispute to arbitration in insolvency 
proceedings.33
Unlike in the past, when Indian courts frequently interfered with 
arbitration proceedings and awards (international and domestic)—under 
the notion that it was the duty of courts to keep arbitrators within the 
law34—the 1996 Act establishes certain judicial limitations. The very 
purpose of § 5 of the 1996 Act was to provide certainty regarding the 
extent of judicial intervention. Further, § 8(1) mandates courts to com-
pel arbitration and stay arbitration proceedings where the parties have 
referred their dispute to a valid arbitration agreement. Yet the mere exis-
tence of provisions favoring arbitration does not guarantee an absolute 
respect of the arbitral process, which may be subject to many dilatory 
tactics initiated by a party wishing to delay or hinder the arbitration. 
Judicial intervention may thus be a true asset to counter such dilatory 
tactics and help effectuate the parties’ intent to arbitrate their dispute. 
In fact, in some instances, it may be the only viable alternative for the 
party whose rights are breached.
23 See Singh, supra note 5 (finding that the 1996 Act reduces the need for judicial 
intervention and grants greater autonomy to arbitral tribunal decisions).
24 See infra notes 25-33 (discussing individual provisions of the 1996 Act).
25 The 1996 Act, § 8.
26 Id. § 9.
27 Id. § 11.
28 Id. § 27.
29 Id. § 34.
30 Id. § 36.
31 Id. § 37.
32 Id. § 39.
33 Id. § 41.
34 Fali S. Nariman, Remarks, India and International Arbitration, 41 Geo. WAsh. 
Int’l l. rev. 367, 370-71 (2009).
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II. Analysis
A. Applying Part I Provisions to Arbitrations Exclusively 
Governed by Part II: Extending The Scope of Judicial 
Intervention
As stated above, the 1996 Act limits judicial intervention to only 
those matters expressly mentioned in the Act.35 Usually, judicial inter-
vention is narrowly tailored to situations in which the court’s involve-
ment is necessary to assist the arbitral process. In that aspect, the 1996 
Act clearly reproduces the Model Law. Yet, with respect to judicial inter-
vention, the Act departs from the Model Law in a distinct way, whereas 
the Model Law applies only to international commercial arbitration, the 
1996 Act applies to international, foreign, and domestic arbitrations.36 
This has given rise to some complications and uncertainties regard-
ing the 1996 Act’s scope—particularly those related to the granting of 
interim measures by national courts in the context of international com-
mercial arbitrations.
Part I of the 1996 Act governs only those arbitrations seated in 
India. This encompasses arbitrations considered as international com-
mercial arbitrations pursuant to § 2(1)(f), so long as the seat is within 
Indian territory.37 Accordingly, section 9, which provides for interim 
measures and mirrors the Model Law’s approach, applies to domestic 
arbitral proceedings. Although Article 1(2) of the Model Law states that 
its provisions “apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory” 
of the State, it also makes exceptions and clarifies that this limitation of 
the scope of the Model Law does not apply to other articles.38 In fact, 
the other articles of the Model Law apply to international arbitrations, 
35 The 1996 Act, §5
36 See supra notes 15-19 (discussing the distinction made between domestic, 
international, and foreign).
37 In that respect, the 1996 Act departs from the Model Law under which foreign 
arbitration is subsumed within the broader category of international arbitration. Art 1 
of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, adopted Dec. 11 1985, available at http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html.
38 For example, it does not apply to § 8 (arbitration agreement and substantive 
claim before court), § 9 (arbitration agreement and interim measures by court), § 
17(H) (recognition and enforcement), § 17(I) (grounds for refusing recognition 
or enforcement), 17J (Court-ordered interim measures), 35 (Recognition and 
enforcement) and § 36 (grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement).
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even where the seat of arbitration is abroad. There is therefore a sub-
stantial difference between Indian court involvement through interim 
measures—limited to domestic arbitrations—and the Model Law provi-
sions that allow the issuance of interim measures to arbitral proceedings 
located outside the court’s country. This distinction is further illuminated 
by Part II of the 1996 Act, which fails to provide for interim measures. 
Reading the plain language of the 1996 Act necessarily results in the 
understanding that issuance of interim measures is strictly limited to 
arbitrations seated in India—Indian courts will not have jurisdiction to 
issue interim measures to support an arbitration held outside India.
The question of whether § 2(2) stripped Indian courts’ jurisdiction 
to issue interim measures in international commercial arbitrations held 
outside India was decided in the seminal case of Bhatia International v. 
Bulk Trading S.A.39 In Bhatia, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve 
the ambiguity of § 2(2) by taking the bold view that despite its contrary 
wording, the entire Part I of the Act was also applicable to international 
commercial arbitration held outside India,40 thereby indisputably going 
against the conceptual and architectural demarcations established by 
the 1996 Act between foreign and domestic arbitrations. To support its 
holding, the Court reasoned that it was necessary to determine whether 
the language of the 1996 Act was so plain and unambiguous as to admit 
only one interpretation.41 One may however question what ambiguity 
exactly lies in “Scope. This Part shall apply where the place of arbitra-
tion is in India.”42 Yet, finding that the language was ambiguous, the 
Court engaged in a lengthy discussion about the purpose of the 1996 
Act, reasoning that “[t]he conventional way of interpreting a statute is 
to seek the intention of its makers.”43 What appears to be the driving 
force behind the Court’s decision is its belief that adhering to the plain 
language of the 1996 Act would culminate in untenable results.44 Thus, 
the Bhatia judgment rendered Part I—meant to deal with domestic 
39 (2002) 4 S.C.C. 105.
40 See Bhatia, (2002) 4 S.C.C. at 110 (providing that courts in India would have 
jurisdiction even in respect of an international commercial arbitration because an 
ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied, it has to be express).
41 Id. at 108.
42 The 1996 Act, § 2(2).
43 Bhatia, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 105.
44 See id. at 107-08 (wherein the Court listed undesirable consequences of not 
expanding the scope of Part I, e.g., stating that it would mean that there is no law in 
India governing such arbitrations).
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arbitration in India—applicable to arbitrations located outside India. 
Although the intention of the court may have been to assist arbitration 
by rectifying the anomaly between the Model Law and the 1996 Act, it 
may have gone too far in expanding the scope of Part II by making Part 
I applicable to arbitration outside the territory of India.45 The decision 
of the Court is in sharp contrast to the Model Law considering that the 
Model Law itself does not contemplate granting such broad powers to 
national courts.46
While the Bhatia decision has been hailed for attempting to assist 
international commercial arbitration in interpreting the 1996 Act 
according to the New York Convention and the Model Law, others have 
criticized it for overreaching and judicial “law-making.”47 Extending the 
powers of Indian national courts to international commercial arbitra-
tions held outside India also opened up the possibility of challenging 
foreign-rendered awards in Indian courts. Thus, the Bhatia judgment 
may have inadvertently vested Indian courts with powers beyond those 
envisioned by the drafters of the Model Law, and which could poten-
tially be adversely utilized against arbitration.
The Bhatia decision has been described as “well-intentioned” but 
“seriously flawed,” and “manifestly erroneous”48 because of its failure 
to read Part I—applicable to arbitrations seated in India—separate from 
Part II, which deals exclusively with arbitrations seated outside India. 
In doing so, the court failed to follow the letter of the law and instead 
relied on its own conception of the 1996 Act’s intent.49 It is arguable 
whether the Court’s understanding of the “spirit of the act” is in line 
with the relevant legislative purpose of rendering arbitration more effi-
cient—including limiting judicial interference.
In subsequent decisions, Bhatia’s rationale was upheld. For example, 
in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Limited,50 
the Supreme Court of India held that a party in India could challenge 
an international arbitral award under section 34, which provides for the 
grounds to set aside an award, even if the award was rendered outside 
45 Especially considering that the Model Law itself does not contemplate granting 
such broad powers to national courts.
46 See supra, Part C (discussing Article 5 of the Model Law, which limits the courts’ 
involvement in international arbitration).
47 Nariman, supra note 34, at 376.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 (2008) 4 S.C.C. 190.
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India.51 But, the Court went on to state that such challenge was only 
possible if the parties agreement did not expressly or impliedly exclude 
the applicability of either the challenge provision specifically (i.e., sec-
tion 34), or Part I altogether.52 Thus, jurisprudential construction of the 
1996 Arbitration Act by Indian courts has created situations outside of 
those contemplated by the Model Law.
Perhaps with this in mind, the Supreme Court of India in Bharat 
Aluminum v. Kaiser Aluminum,53 has begun to hear consolidated appeals 
that may reverse the controversial Indian judgments increasing the power 
of national courts to intervene in international arbitration seated outside 
Indian jurisdiction.54 The hearing commenced on January 10, 2012, 
with observations from the Supreme Court that it was of the prima facie 
view that its judgment in Bhatia should be reconsidered.55 The outcome 
of this case may provide an impetus to bring Indian jurisprudence into 
the pro-arbitration realm.56
B. Setting Aside Awards on “Public Policy” Grounds Under 
The Indian 1996 Act
The enforcement of an arbitral award is a fundamental stage in 
which judicial intervention is justified and unlikely to be forbidden. 
Naturally, the breadth of judicial scrutiny may vary depending on the 
court’s construction of the grounds available to challenge the award—
whether such challenge occurs as an objection to the enforcement or 
as an independent action to vacate the award. Additionally, the more 
favorable the jurisdiction is toward arbitration, the more restrictive the 
interpretation of those grounds will be. On the other hand, extending the 
51 But see Promod Nair, A New Year, A New Start in India, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com (stating that the Supreme Court 
and various High Courts in the country have subsequently sought to narrow down 
the scope of the decision, as well as display greater willingness in recent years to 
infer implied exclusions of the Indian Arbitration Act in relation to arbitrations seated 
outside India).
52 Venture, (2008) 4 S.C.C. 197.
53 2005 A.I.R. 21 (Chh.) 1.
54 The original appeal was brought by India’s Bharat Aluminum against Kaiser 
Aluminum Technical Services; however, ten other appeals have been joined, all raising 
the same issue.
55 See Nair, supra note 51 (discussing the Court’s initial observations).
56 Id.
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scope of the grounds available to challenge or oppose the enforcement 
of an award will increase judicial scrutiny in arbitration.
The scope of the court’s degree of intervention during the award’s 
enforcement stage has generated much debate in India, particularly 
regarding section 34 of the 1996 Act, which pertains to the conditions 
for vacating an award. Courts have been especially conflicted with what 
constitutes public policy for purposes of setting an award under the Act. 
In Renusager Power Co. v. General Electric Co.,57 the Indian Supreme 
Court looked to American jurisprudence for guidance as to what consti-
tutes public policy.58 Specifically, the Indian Supreme Court adopted the 
approach taken by the Second Circuit in U.S. in Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (Rakta) 
and Bank of America,59 a case in which the court cautioned against an 
expansive construction of the public policy defense.60
The Indian Supreme Court further referred to Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.,61 noting that in addressing international arbitration agree-
ments, the U.S. Supreme Court has disapproved a refusal by the courts 
of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement as well 
as the “parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our 
laws and in our courts.”62 The Indian Supreme Court likewise pointed 
to Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,63 a 
case in which the U.S. court held that enforcement of the agreement was 
required by notions of international comity, respect for foreign tribunals 
and the need for predictability in resolving commercial disputes.64
The Supreme Court of India concluded that the public policy excep-
tion should be construed narrowly; it is only satisfied when the award 
violated (i) the fundamental policy of Indian law; (ii) the interest of 
57 (1994) 1 S.C.C. 644.
58 Id. at 666.
59 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1976).
60 See id. at 973 (“An expansive construction of this [public policy] defense would 
vitiate the Convention’s basic effort to remove preexisting obstacles to enforcement... 
We conclude, therefore, that the convention’s public policy defense should be 
construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this 
basis only where enforcement would violate the forum State’s most basic notions of 
morality and justice.”).
61 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
62 Rensugar, (1994) 1 S.C.C. at 667 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519).
63 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
64 Id. at 628-29.
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India; and (iii) the justice of morality.65 Yet, Rensugar’s narrow public 
policy precedent may be subject to certain controversies, especially 
since this Court has partially expanded the scope of what amounts to 
public policy under section 34 of the 1996 Act.
Indeed, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v. Saw Pipes Ltd.,66 also 
included challenges where the award was “patently illegal.”67 The court 
further defined “patently illegal” as an award contrary to the substantive 
provisions of the applicable law, the provisions of the 1996 Act, or the 
terms of the contract.68 Such a broad interpretation of public policy has 
been criticized as arming Indian courts with “potentially limitless judi-
cial review.”69 This expansive power of judicial review is the exact oppo-
site of what the 1996 Act was intended to effectuate when enacted.70
The expansion of the scope of public policy continued in Venture. 
In this case, an arbitral tribunal seated in London rendered an award 
in favor of an Indian company, Satyam Computers Services Ltd. and 
against a U.S. based company, Venture Global Engineering.71 Venture 
Global Engineering tried to resist enforcement of the arbitral award in 
the United States but failed.72 It then challenged the arbitral award in an 
Indian court on public policy grounds submitted pursuant to Part I § 34 
of the 1996 Act.73 Both the trial and High Court, on appeal, rightly held 
that Venture Global Engineering was not entitled to challenge a foreign 
award in India since any action to set aside an award under section 34 is 
strictly limited to awards rendered in India.
However, on further appeal to the Indian Supreme Court, the Court 
held that, as valid precedent, the Bhatia decision permitted the American 
company to challenge foreign awards in India pursuant to Part I of the 
1996 Act—this is so, even though Part I applies only to arbitral awards 
made in India.74 Moreover, according to Part II of the 1996 Act, foreign 
65 Rensugar, (1994) 1 S.C.C. at 668.
66 (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705.
67 Id. at 714-15.
68 Id. at 715.
69 Dipen Sabharwal, Another Setback for Indian Arbitration (and Foreign Investors), 
Int’l DIsputes Q. 1, 6 (Spr. 2008), www.whitecase.com/files/upload/fileRepository/
IDQ_Spring_2008.pdf
70 Id.
71 Venture Global Eng’g v. Satyam Computer Servs., (2008) 4 S.C.C. 190, 191.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 197.
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awards brought to India “would be enforceable. . . and treated as binding 
for all purposes on the persons as between whom it was made” unless 
such enforcement was refused on one or more of the grounds set out 
in Part II section 48.75 Thus, reading Part I as expanding the scope of 
Part II completely contravenes and circumvents the provisions of sec-
tion 48, because whereas section 48 focuses on enforcement, section 34 
deals only with refusing an award.76 This means that, absent the winning 
party’s submission to Indian courts to enforce its award, the losing party 
has no recourse in an Indian court.77 For these reasons, the decision in 
Venture Global has been characterized as not just wrong but also “quite 
inexplicable.”78
Because the 1996 Act was promulgated to modernize India’s arbi-
tral regulatory framework as well as to provide certainty regarding the 
extent of judicial intervention, effectuating the Act requires courts to 
implement a more pro-arbitration approach. By keeping this goal at the 
forefront of judicial decision-making, Indian courts would understand 
that—notwithstanding “ambiguous” language—the purpose of the 1996 
Act is to assist India in complying with its international obligations 
under the New York Convention. This would result in more consistent 
judicial compliance.
ConClusIon
Designed to echo the Model Law, the 1996 Act was tailored to assist 
India in complying with its international obligations under the New 
York Convention. However, in addressing both domestic and interna-
tional commercial arbitration in the same legislation, the Act has faced 
obstacles. In certain key provisions, the text of the 1996 Act has also 
veered away from the text of the Model Law. The result has been that 
over the years, Indian courts have rendered a myriad of decisions that 
are often blatantly inconsistent with each other and with the letter of the 
law. Additionally, in many instances, these courts reached conclusions 
75 See The 1996 Act, Part II §§ 46, 48 (discussing the enforceability and non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
76 See id. § 48 (“Enforcement of an award may be refused,” on the grounds provided 
for in this section) (emphasis added).
77 Compare language in Part I § 34 of the 1996 Act (“Application for setting aside 
arbitral award”), with language in Part II § 48 (“Conditions for enforcement of foreign 
award”).
78 Nariman, supra note 34, at 376.
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that were most likely never intended by the drafters of the 1996 Act 
or the Model Law. To facilitate international commercial arbitration 
in India, domestic courts would need to take a more pro-arbitration 
approach, while following the limits and scope recommended by the 
Model Law. If the 1996 Act is based on the Model Law as its preamble 
suggests, these courts should be more sensitive to international arbitra-
tion practice. Indian courts should be mindful that international com-
mercial arbitration was designed as an alternative forum for dispute 
resolution—a forum to which commercial parties bargaining at arms 
length have chosen to resort.
As has been demonstrated by this Article, the role of the courts is to 
assist the arbitration process to the maximum extent possible, and not to 
take the dispute resolution process away from the arbitral tribunal. If this 
fundamental notion is heeded, many of the present controversies may be 
mitigated by the national courts providing due assistance to arbitration. 
Finally, until the Supreme Court of India decides on the consolidated 
appeals in Bharat, it would be prudent for counsel to advice interested 
parties to expressly exclude the application of Part I of the 1996 Act to 
their arbitration agreements thereby effectively preventing Indian courts 
from unduly interfering with arbitration proceedings seated outside 
India.
